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CASE COMMENTS

separation of powers provision in order to arrive at what in essence
amounted to a more expedient and practical result.
Daniel L. Schofield

Estate Tax-The Relevancy of State Court
Adjudication of Property Rights
In 1930 decedent, D, created a revocable trust which as amended
in 1931 provided his wife, W, with income for life and a general
power of appointment over the corpus. In 1951 W executed an
instrument purporting to change it to a special power. Upon D's
death in 1957 the executor of the estate in paying federal estate
taxes attempted to claim the value of the widow's trust as a marital
deduction under section 2056(b) (5) of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code.' However, the commissioner determined that the trust
corpus did not qualify because of the 1951 release. The respondent,
who was the executor, then filed a petition for redetermination in the
Tax Court. However, while this was pending the respondent filed a
petition in the Supreme Court of New York asking for a determination of the validity of the release. The state court found the release
to be a nullity; the Tax Court then accepted the state court judgment as being an, "authoritative exposition of New York law and
adjudication of the property rights involved," and allowed the
marital deduction. Held; reversed and remanded. When the application of a federal statute is involved the decision of the state
trial court as to an underlying issue concerning relevant property
rights is not controlling if there is no decision by the highest court
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056 (b) (5):
Life estate with power of appointment in surviving spouse.-In the
case of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his
surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the entire
interest,

.

. .

with power in the surviving spouse to appoint the

entire interest. . . . (exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse,
or of the estate of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either,
whether or not in each case the power is exercisable in favor of
others), and with no power in any other person to appoint any part
of the interest, or such specific portion, to any person other than
the surviving spouse(A) the interest . . . so passing, shall, for the purposes of
subsection (a), be considered as passing to the surviving spouse,
and (B) no part of the interest so passing shall, for the purposes of
paragraph (1) (A) be considered as passing to any person other than
the surviving spouse....

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1967

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 12
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

of the state concerning the matter. When there is no decision by
the highest court of the state, federal authority must apply what it
finds to be state law after giving proper regard to relevant rulings
of other courts of the state. Commissioner v. Bosch, 385 U.S. 966
(1967).
State law is involved to some degree in almost all federal tax
determinations. Many times parties procure a state court judgment purely for tax purposes, thus making possible post-death
estate planning.2 The principal case represents the United States
Supreme Court's position as to whether a federal court or agency in
a federal estate tax controversy is conclusively bound by a state
trial court adjudication of relevant property rights made in proceedings to which the United States was not a party.
The settled rule is that state proceedings do not have the effect
of res judicata on the commissioner when he is not made a party to
the proceedings.' As a result an analysis of federal court decisions
reveals three positions as to the conclusiveness of state court adjudication of property rights.
One position is that the federal court should consider itself
bound by a state court decree only after independent examination
of the state law as determined by the highest court of the state.
The advocates of this position say that if the highest court in the
state has not passed on the matter then the federal court should not
be bound but should decide the case as they feel the highest
state court would have decided it.'
A second view expresses the idea that a state court adjudication
is binding on the commissioner when the judgment is a result of an
adversary proceeding in the state court.
Advocates of a third school of thought argue that if the issue has
been fairly presented to a state court for its independent decision
and it is so decided, the resulting judgment, if binding upon the
parties under state law, is conclusive as to the property rights in the
federal tax case.!
2 Cardozo, Federal Taxes and the Radiating Potencies o

State Court

Decisions, 51 YALE L.J. 783 (1941).
3 Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
4 Faulkerson's Estate v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th
Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962).
5 King v. Order of Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
6 Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.
7 Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3rd Cir. 1955).
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In adopting the first position, that the Commissioner should be
bound only by decisions of the highest court in the state, the
majority in the principal case views the problem as one of construing a federal taxing statute. Since a federal taxing statute was
being construed, the Court looked to the legislative history surrounding its adoption. In surveying the history of this statute,
the court found that the report of the finance committee used
"very guarded language" in referring to the effect of state court decisions.
The majority reasoned that when the application of a federal
statute is involved, the decision of a state trial court as to an
underlying issue of state law should not be controlling. The court
said this is but an application of the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.9 Erie dealt with cases of diversity of citizenship, saying that
state law as announced by the highest court of the state was to be
followed. The court applied Erie in the principal case even
though the latter was not a diversity case, saying, "the same principle may be applied for the same reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on state law and the state's highest
court is the best authority on the law." 0
The majority in Bosch justified their position as one that will
avoid much of the uncertainty resulting from the "non-adversary"
approach while at the same time it will be fair to the taxpayer and
protect the federal revenue.
Faulkerson'sEstate v. United States," involved a situation somewhat analogous to the principal case. In Faulkerson the Commissioner was attempting to recover federal estate taxes but was faced
with an Indiana Circuit Court decree in an ex parte proceeding
which declared Mrs. Faulkerson to be the sole beneficiary of her
husband's will and therefore entitled the estate to take a marital
deduction of one-half the value of the adjusted gross estate for
federal tax purposes.
The court in Faulkerson was at least in partial accord with the
majority in Bosch. In Faulkerson the court said the District court
The report indicates that "proper regard," not finality, "should be given
to interpretations of the will" by state courts and then only when entered by
a court "in a bona fide adversary proceeding." See S. Rep. No. 1013, Part 2,
80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4.
9304
U.S. 64 (1938).
10
Commissioner v. Bosch, 385 U.S. 996, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 1783 (1967).

"1301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962).
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was not bound by the circuit decree since the circuit decree was
rendered in an ex parte proceeding and collusive in the sense that
a decision was sought which would adversey affect the government's right to additional estate tax. The Faulkerson decision
relied heavily on the fact that the decision in the circuit court
was from one of approximately 84 such courts of equal jurisdiction
in Indiana whose decisions are not binding on each other.
Another case that seems to be in accord with the Bosch majority
on the question of the binding effect of state court decrees is
Brainardv. Commissioner.2 In Brainardthe court held that federal
courts were not bound by Illinois circuit courts of equal jurisdiction
which are not bound by the rulings of each other. The court said
that for the interpretation of the laws of Illinois one must look
to the supreme and appellate courts of that state because their
rulings are binding upon all of the inferior courts of Illinois.
As stated earlier a second group of cases has taken the position
that the Commissioner should be bound by the state court decisions
only when they are the result of an adversary proceeding. These
cases would not go as far as the majority in discrediting all
lower court rulings, but would only rule out those cases decided
in the lower state courts where there was not a true adversary proceeding. Chief among these cases is Pierpont v. Commissioner."
In Pierpont the court was asked to determine the validity of
a state court decision declaring that a widow held the requisite
power of appointment which enabled her to qualify for a marital
deduction in filing federal estate tax returns. The court cited
Morgan v. Commissioner which said, "state law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests ...shall be taxed."1 4 However, the court in Pierpont said
it did not feel that the Commissioner should be bound by this
decision of the state court because it was a non-adversary proceeding by which the court did nothing more than "rubber stamp" a decree without any independent inquiry of law.
Mr. Justice Harlan, who dissented in the principal case because
he felt state court decisions could be considered binding under certain circumstances, took a position much like Pierpont. Justice
12
13
14

91 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 665 (1938).
336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964).

309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
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Harlan felt that because of the balance required between federal
and state judicial systems, the following criterion were appropriate for consideration in adopting a rule: (1) uniformity in the
administration of law, (2) states' rights in measuring the requirements of their own laws, and (3) protection of federal revenues
from ill-considered state court decisions.
For these reasons Justice Harlan took the same position espoused
in Freuler v. Helvering,'6 stating that the Commissioner should not
be bound by lower state court decrees unless the proceeding was
untainted by fraud, and the decisions were the result of reasoned
argument from parties holding genuinely inconsistent positions.
As can be seen this follows Pierpont.
A third opinion, expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas, also dissenting
in the principal case, said the whole question in the case was simply
whether a federal court can ignore a state court judgment when
federal taxation depends on property rights already judged by state
court proceedings.
Justice Douglas, citing Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap,'6 said that
it has always been held that federal courts must look to state legislation and state decisions for the state law to be applied. Moreover,
he cited cases stating that the federal court is obligated to follow the
decision of a lower state court in the absence of the decisions of
the state supreme court showing that the state law is other than announced by the lower court.'"
Mr. Justice Douglas relied on Blair v. Commissioner.'8 In Blair
the federal court had held that assignments under a trust were
invalid and the income was taxable to the beneficiary. The trustees
then brought an action in a state court where, contra to the federal
court ruling, the assignments were determined to be valid. On
appeal the United States Supreme Court held that there was final
adjudication of the property rights in the state court, and the federal
court had to give credence to the rights as decided. The significance
of the Blair decision here is the fact that it was long followed as
the leading case in this area; however, the decision of the majority
in Bosch seems to be opposite the holding in Blair.
's291 U.S. 35 (1934).
16 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
7
1
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); West v.
American Tel. & Tel Co. 311 U.S. 223 (1940).
18 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
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Justice Douglas felt, that by not giving effect to a state court
determination, an unfair treatment of taxpayers and a system
contrary to congressional purpose of making federal tax consequences depend upon rights under state law would result. Justice
Douglas anticipated the problem of taxing an individual or his
estate for benefits which he does not have under state law.
The dissent by Justice Douglas appears to be consistent with
the position of the Third Circuit in Gallagher v. Smith.'9 In Gallagher the court said it was not necessary to reach a conclusion as to
whether the proceedings were adversary or non-adversary; but,
the test should be whether the adjudication of property rights was
final and binding under state law, and was not obtained by collusion for the purpose of defeating the tax.
The opinion of Justice Douglas seemed to question the relevancy
of the Erie doctrine as adopted by the majority. The Erie doctrine
does, after all, seek to establish the criteria whereby federal courts
are to determine the law generally applicable to diversity cases."
It is not directed at the effect to be given a prior state court
judgment affecting property rights of a party against whom a tax
liability is asserted. Furthermore, wide application of the Erie
doctrine, as interpreted by the majority, may lead to the imposition
of a tax against a person who has been the prevailing party in a
lower state court proceeding and has no ground for appeal to the
highest court in the state to discover whether his property rights

were properly adjudicated.
It appears that the decision in the principal case has helped to
eliminate one more tax avoidance device in the estate tax structure. However, this was accomplished at the expense of giving
the Commissioner more authority in making his own determinations of state law in applying the federal taxing statutes. This may
seem a large price to pay because many practical problems could
arise from this licensed federal power of interference with state
court decisions. It remains to be seen how far the Commissioner
will go in exercising this power.
The court in the principal case dealt at great length with the
problem of construing federal taxing statutes. However, the opinion
19 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
2oC. WRiGHT, FEDERAL COURTS

194 (1963).
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did not give any indication as to whether the decision will be
applied to non-tax cases where the decision of a lower state court
is involved.' Conceiveably the principles enunciated in Bosch
could be applied to non-tax federal cases as well as tax cases.
Patrick David Deem

Evidence-Expert Testimony-Quantity and Quality

Required to Establish Causal Relation
P's decedent was injured in an automobile accident when he
was thrown violently against his seat belt placing sudden, severe
pressure on his abdominal and pelvic organs, and allegedly resulting in the aggravation and acceleration of a pre-existing cancer of
the left testicle. The cancer subsequently spread through decendent's body, and he died some nine months later. There was a
jury vedict for P in her action charging D with negligence. Held,
affirmed. Expert medical testimony, standing alone, stating there
is a possibility of a casual relationship between a given accident
and subsequent death is not sufficient. However, when such expert
testimony is combined with uncontradicted non-expert evidence as
to the decedent's general good health prior to the accident, including evidence that he had had no prior difficulties with his
testicles, prostate, urinary tract, or kidneys, the evidence is sufficient to establish a causal relationship. National Dairy Products
Corporationv. Durham, 154 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App. 1967).
Courts vary considerably on what quantity and quality of expert
testimony are necessary to establish a causal relationship. Although
most courts accept probability as sufficient, some jurisdictions take
the more lenient Georgia view and permit evidence of possible
connection along with other evidence to satisfy the requirement.
The dissent in the principal case stressed the need of probability.
Contending that the causal connection upheld by the majority was
too speculative and conjectural to support a recovery, the dissent
reasoned that use of the words "if," "possibility" and "might" by
21 See Torres v. Gardner, 270 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R. 1967) where in vacating
the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, the court
held that the determination by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico that children
were the sole and universal heirs of the wage earner was res judicata on the
administrative agency.
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